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In 2000, the Popular Party (PP, the conservative party) won the elections reaching absolute 
majority, unlike 1995 when they obtained simple majority and they had to negotiate with the 
Basque and Catalan nationalist parties to get approval of some of their politics. However these 
agreements never embedded a culture of dialogue and the conflicts became more accentuated at the 
end of their first term (Tusell, 2000: 239). The Spanish president, José María Aznar, interpreted the 
results as a big electoral support for his project and started a new orientation in some areas such as 
the relation with nationalism. The division between the Basque nationalist party (PNV) and PP 
increased after all the nationalist parties (including Herri Batasuna, the radical left party close to the 
terrorist group, ETA) pretended to develop a political frame, that would contribute to reaching 
freedom, while the two biggest national parties, PP and Partido Socialista (PSOE, social democrats) 
agreed to fight against terrorism and the nationalist environment together. In that context, Aznar 
undertook the definition of the nation maintaining this division and tried to find a way of 
formulating Spanish nationalism and getting some accept by the citizens. 
In this paper I will examine the discursive formation constituted by PP to redefine the Spanish 
nationalism using the idea of constitutional patriotism, which emanates from the academic debate, 
in competition with the social democrat party, that aspires also to apply this signifier to establish 
their own project and collaborate with the nationalist parties, who are against the traditional 
conception of Spanish nationalism. In order to analyse this issue I will use discourse theory, 
especially as it has been conceived by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. I will show the political 
implications as the result of the fixation of a new consensus and how the consensus is constituted 
against other formations and therefore it covers up a kind of particularism, although it assumes the 
form of national or universal interest.  
 
 The difficulties of the Spanish nationalism 
 
In the first part I will draw on some of the problematics about Spanish nationalism and its 
impact on the construction of the Spanish nation. After analysing the difference between nation and 
state and explaining some historical and political aspects which will help to understand the current 
situation, I will apply three concepts from Étienne Balibar’s theory in order to explain the national 
formation: ethnical features, primary and secondary identities, and visible and invisible nationalism. 
My intention is to make the context in which the conservative party launches a new discursive 
formation aimed to revitalize the Spanish nationalism comprehensive.  
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The public debate in Spain is strongly impregnated by the discussion about the so called 
peripheral nationalisms – mainly Catalonia and Basque Country – and the role that the central state 
should play. Nevertheless it is still difficult to find well articulated arguments to defend the Spanish 
nation – although they have become more recurrent within the last decade – and even more to 
support a sort of Spanish nationalism. In principle, this lack of Spanish nationalism may sound 
strange when other nationalisms are very present and frequently define some targets and projects 
against the interest or the idea of the Spanish nation. In the following paragraphs, I will account for 
the reasons that explain this phenomena and how the discursive formation is constituted. I want to 
point out that my focus is on the Spanish nation but obviously it is impossible to analyse it without 
considering the role of the peripheral nationalisms. 
The main problem consists in finding a successful formula to integrate all the regional 
sensibilities in the national state and, besides, to satisfy all these sensibilities feeling comfortable 
under a common idea of the nation. It is actually one of the issues which usually cause more 
confusion because there is no clear distinction between nation and state (Tusell, 1999: 13). There is 
a tendency to believe that the national state is conformed by the equation ‘one state = one nation’. 
This conception excludes other possibilities, like multinational states, but most people create a 
polarization between those who want that one nation is accepted equally by all the regions and those 
who aspire to have their own state because they consider themselves to be a nation. The 
reductionism of positions prevents any kind of solution since both sides are completely 
incompatible. 
According to Etienne Balibar, ‘fictitious ethnicity’ is the community conformed by the 
national state (1998: 149). There is no nation that belongs naturally to an ethnic community but the 
community is nationalized by the state and institutions, especially education. As a result the 
community is presented as natural and its values and culture are tied to the foundational identity. 
The ethnicity is principally naturalized by referring to race and language. It has always been very 
difficult to implement unity of the nation. The centralized dictatorship was not capable of creating a 
national community for all the Spaniards and, on the contrary, made the symbols and the common 
history and tradition suspicious since their arbitrariness was being used to legitimate the regime. On 
the other hand, the peripheral nationalisms maintain their own original community that collides with 
the recognition of the Spanish community. 
When Spain starts the transition to democracy, the emerging Constitution offers a possibility 
of including all the regions in the same state structure. In 1978 the Constitution tries to conciliate 
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three realities; Spain, nationalities and regions (Fusi, 2000: 47), in order to respond to the 
nationalist demands – mainly the Basque and the Catalan but also the Galician. The result is the 
state of the autonomies, which is included in the Title VII. The state form is not decentralised but it 
is open to decentralisation, because it is the only way to reach a wide consensus (Ruipérez, 1988: 
226-227). The lack of closure, however, entails an ongoing process of redefinition of the regional 
structure1. Besides it is remarkable that the term ‘autonomía’ designates two categories: 
nationalities, reserved for Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, and regions, where all the others 
are included.   
Regarding the national identity, article 2 states that the Constitution is based on the 
indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation. The national closure contrasts with the state openness. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the political demands of the nationalisms to get more autonomy 
are presented at the same time as the demands of higher recognition of their national entity. The 
unity of the nation faces two challenges. Firstly, the development of regional governments and the 
gradual acquisition of more competences imply a questioning of the state as being sustained on only 
one community or nation – in this sense, unity sounds inappropriate when there is a perception of 
diverse identities. Secondly, the unity is linked to the Spanish nationalism as it was build up under 
the franquist regime. This association worries above all the right-wing party who is afraid of losing 
its image as a modern and reformist party. This fear, among other things, explains the 
indecisiveness of the national discursive formation (Uriarte, 2002: 273-274) and the obstacles to 
find a signifier that favours the articulation of a national community summarizing diversity and 
avoiding to reduce diversity to unity, understood as homogeneity.     
Even if it is assumed that the nation resides in the fictitious ethnicity, it does not mean that the 
whole ethnic identity can be constituted on the basis of the nation in stead of other features. 
Therefore Balilbar (2003: 54-58) distinguishes between primary identity and secondary identity. 
The national identity is secondary in the sense of being above the primary identities such as 
regional, sexual, religious, linguistic, class-based, etc. Belonging to a nation can be a signifier 
which includes other identities by means of hegemonizing them. For instance, the category ‘being 
Dane’ can be open and cover all kind of religions or can be more narrow and exclude the religions 
which are not considered as a part of the secondary identity. In the Spanish case, the hegemony of 
                                                 
1 The constitution of the state of autonomies is completed between 1979 and 1983 and a total of seventeen autonomies 
as recognized such as. However neither their distribution nor the demands of competences are completely finished. 
Thus the structure of the state is continuing decentralization. The nationalist parties press the central state in order to 
achieve more competences and the other regions want to reach similar levels of autonomy and self-government.  
 4 
the secondary identity encounters serious problems as to constituting a discursive formation as 
‘Spanish’ or ‘Spanish nation’ since other primary identities, such as the linguistic and the regional, 
claim to be recognized as secondary – which is the case of the Basque and the Catalan nations. 
The problematic relation between primary and secondary identities in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, which hinders a wider ‘Spanish’ hegemony, increases if the identity in the rest of 
the regions is taken in account. According to the CIS2 survey in 2007, the degree of identification is 
quite strong at the local, regional and national level: 
 
  Not identified at 
all (0-1)  
(2-
3)  
(4-
6)  
(7-
8)  
Very identified 
(9-10)  
N.S.  N.C.  . (N) 
Town or city where she lives 1.4 1.9 14.5 34.1 47.3 0.5 0.3 (3191) 
Comunidad autónoma  1.0 2.2 15.5 31.8 48.3 0.8 0.5 (3191) 
Basque country  7.9 3.5 16.7 31.1 36.3 3.5 1.0 (206) 
Catalan speaking areas 13.9 6.4 29.9 22.6 21.6 4.2 1.3 (915) 
Spain  2.1 2.1 16.9 28.7 49.4 0.6 0.2 (3191) 
Europe  3.3 3.2 31.9 33.3 22.8 5.1 0.5 (3191) 
Spanish speaking community 
in the World  
6.3 4.8 40.2 25.5 13.6 8.6 0.9 (3191) 
Humanity 2.0 2.6 26.4 29.1 32.8 6.5 0.7 (3191) 
 
It is clear that the Spaniards are quite or very identified with the place where they live, their 
own region and Spain. It does not seem to be a problem to have shared identities (Uriarte, 2002: 
267) in which the primary and the secondary identities are compatible and even harmonious. It 
could be a little bit more surprising that the identification with the Basque Country is stronger than 
with the region in the Catalan speaking areas. The reason is that the Catalan speaking areas, apart 
from Catalonia, also include Valencia, where the feeling of belonging to Spain is stronger and there 
is no identification with the aims of the Catalan nationalist parties. Thus, the Catalan language can 
be enough to justify the aspirations to be recognized as nation or can be assumed as a primary 
identity which belongs to ‘being Spaniard’ as a secondary identity. Anyway, it could be useful to 
                                                 
2 CIS is the Social Research Centre in Spain. 
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compare the identification with the regional and the national levels – which this survey does not 
show – to understand the dynamic between the identities better.   
The balance between primary and secondary identities destabilizes in the regions where there 
are national feelings – and the region is perceived as a secondary identity, i.e. like a nation. The data 
from the annual survey from the Basque Country, called Euskobarómetro, shows mayor 
divergences in relation to the identities but also in the way voters from nationalist and national 
parties define their identities. Most of the inhabitants claim to have a shared identity and feeling as 
both Basque and Spanish (39%) but they support national parties: the social democrats (PSOE, 
69%), the left-wing party (EB, 50%) and, to a lesser extent, the conservatives (28%). Only 26% of 
the voters from the nationalist parties assume this identity. In opposition to the low percent of 
people who feel more Spanish than Basque (5%; 26% from PP and 11% from PSOE) and only 
Spanish (6%, 38% from PP and 9% from PSOE), almost half of the survey participants are inclined 
to feel more Basque than Spanish (20%) or only Basque (26%) and a high proportion of nationalist 
voters opts for the last category (the independent EHAK with 94% and the moderate PNV with 40% 
vs. 31% that feel more Basque than Spanish). The shared identity in the Basque Country is not as 
strong as in other regions and the feeling of being Spanish is seriously limited.  
Although it could be argued that most of the Spaniards assume a shared identity and that there 
is only a problem for some (many) inhabitants in the Basque Country and in Catalonia, it is quite 
obvious that trying to impose a Spanish identity as secondary identity in these regions would not be 
a solution (even though it would appeal to the majority at the national level) as far as some (many) 
people from these regions is openly excluded from the nation form. 
The impossibility of reaching a total hegemony does not depend only on the identity but also 
on the perception of the nation. Balibar (2005: 61) points out that nationalism must be explained 
according to the dynamic between invisible and visible nationalism. The first ones, also called 
dominant nationalisms, tend to be based on universalism and support the coexistence of different 
cultures, religions or classes. The second ones are visible because they turn national belonging or 
feeling into their main – sometimes only – demand and minimize the importance of other primary 
identities. Discursively the visible nationalisms resort to resistance and articulate their demands 
against the dominant entity. 
The nationalist parties usually assume the discourse of oppressed people against the central 
state and present themselves as resistance against the imposition of a homogenous culture or 
politics. Apart from the specific reasons I have explain previously, signifiers such as ‘Spanish 
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nationalism’ and ‘Spanish nation’ could be interpreted as a form of dominance and consequently 
confirm the nationalist discourse. The universalism around nation disappears due to the strong 
connotations of oppression, centralism or franquism. For this reason the Spanish nationalism 
reflects the notion of invisible nationalism quite well and it focuses more on the peripheral 
nationalism that threatens universal values such as freedom, solidarity or equality. 
In this chapter I have tried to explain the difficulties of articulating a discursive formation on 
the basis of the Spanish nation, applying Balibar’s theory on nationalism. These conditions will be 
useful to understand the attempt of the right wing to construct a discourse which responds 
satisfactorily to these challenges: the constitution of a common community, the conciliation 
between primary and secondary identities and a way out of the sense of domination.   
 
Signifying nationalism: the constitutional patriotism 
 
In 2002 the conservative party (PP) held their yearly political conference with four panels. 
One of them was called “The constitutional patriotism in the XXI Century”. The document was 
drawn up by the Catalan politician, Josep Piqué3, and the Basque politician, María San Gil4 and this 
was no coincidence. The conference created big expectations but also confusion. The term 
‘constitutional patriotism’ was well known from the academic debate – rather than from public 
discussions – and usually associated with other contexts, especially by Sternberger in German 
because of the successful role of the constitution after the Second World War (Rosales, 1999). 
Furthermore the tradition of constitutional patriotism, in its more recognizable version by Jürgen 
Habermas, had first and foremost been assumed by the centre-left whilst the right wing had not 
shown any specific interest in the notion. In fact, at that moment the leader of the opposition, José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was trying to articulate a new discourse about the nation applying the 
same label. From Zapatero’s perspective the social democracy could be reframed on the terms of 
                                                 
3 Josep Piqué was Minister of Industrial Affairs (1996-2000), of Foreign Affairs (2000-02) and of Science and 
Technology (2002-03). Later his political carreer has been linked to Catalonia. He was candidate to the Catalan 
presidency in 2003, without success, and he left the presidency of the Catalan Popular Party after disagreements with 
the national leaders of the party. 
4 María San Gil is one of the most charismatic politicians in the Basque Country, known for her fight against ETA and 
her permanent confrontation with the nationalists. In 2008 she left the position as president of the Basque Popular Party 
because she was against a more comprehensive relationship with the peripheral nationalisms. 
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republicanism5 and consequently the idea of patriotism would suit this reframing according to 
republican ideals well. 
I consider the conservative project of redefining the Spanish nation to be a discursive struggle, 
in which two opposite discourses compete over the definition of the meaning of one significant and 
articulate their discourses according to their own interpretation. I find Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory 
useful to explain the discursive formation. In the following, my focus will be on the conservative 
formation but I will also pay attention to the recontextualization of a term moving from the 
academic into the political discourse, in opposition with the social democrat alternative.       
Assuming that the practice of articulation “consists in the construction of nodal points with 
partially fixed meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the 
social” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 113), the attempt by the Popular Party to promote ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ is understood as an articulation of the Spanish nationalist discourse. The nodal points 
are, as defined by Laclau & Mouffe, privileged points of partial fixation. Briefly, discourse aims, 
according to both theorists, to reduce the social differences around a signifier. The signifier does not 
have a determined signified link but signifying is acquired through the discursive formation. For 
this reason, Laclau uses the category ‘empty signifiers’ to emphasise that they are not empty 
because they lack meaning but because “any system of signification is structured around an empty 
place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object” (Laclau, 2007: 40). Thus, a signifier 
is emptied in the attempt to define the representation of that object – which is impossible since it is 
discursively structured – and determine the signified. As I referred above, I consider ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ as a nodal point, an empty signified fixed to articulate a national discourse. The fixation 
excludes other possibilities – other floating signifiers – available to constitute alternative 
formations. 
The document presented in the conservative congress in 2002 implies a discursive turn, where 
the nodal point, ‘constitutional patriotism’, is articulated within the constitutional and civil 
discourse. It is an attempt to build a discourse in positive terms (Uriarte, 2003), transcending the 
mere negation of the peripheral nationalist formations. There are some expressions which distance 
themselves from the emotional discourse on nation and create a civic and open frame: “Spain is a 
political nation” – in opposition to the cultural conception of nation defended by the peripheral 
nationalisms –, “We do not pretend to assume any kind of monopoly. No one is the only owner of 
                                                 
5 From the republican tradition, Zapatero finds Phillip Pettit’s work to be the most inspiring. A more detailed 
explanation of the inclusion of republicanism into the Spanish social democratic project can be found in García Agustín 
(2006) and Pettit (2008). 
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the idea of Spain” or “The Constitution has been useful to establish the fundaments of our 
democratic society”. Despite the apparent openness and inclusion, it must be underlined that every 
articulation tends towards closure – fixing elements as moments – and to exclusion – of those who 
are not represented or do not share the discursive construction. 
In this sense, it is important to pay attention to the discursive definition of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’, because it does not reflect the values of the constitutional patriotism as described by the 
more philosofical tradition. The first time it is mentioned, it is defined as an open signifier in 
relation to which other discourses could be articulated and there is no place for exclusion: 
 
We understand constitutional patriotism as a frame-concept: it does not demand that all the political 
sensibilities have the same, exact idea about Spain. What is important is to respect the cores of coexistence: 
plurality, tolerance, liberty, autonomy and unity. Constitutional patriotism is an open concept which should not 
be monopolized by anyone and can be defended by everyone.          
 
The resulting idea of Spain should not be owned by any party and it should not be identified 
with only one party. In principle it should not be a problem to construct a common project around 
this (non)definition. The logic of equivalence is broad and appeals to all the different identities. 
This impression increases when the universal dimension of constitutional nationalism is mentioned 
explicitly in opposition to national movements that exhibit a particular identity based on a common 
history, language or culture: 
 
We know that in spite of the universal dimension of constitutional patriotism, it has a specific, historic and 
cultural expression in every country. Constitutional patriotism is the idea of patriotism which corresponds with 
the political culture shared at this time by all the Western countries with free and democratic institutions. 
 
The values of constitutional patriotism are universal as far they represent the values of 
Western democracies. Laclau (2007) indicates that the universal is maintained by the discourse of 
modernity, which aims to eliminate the differences, and universality always hides a particular 
subject. In this case, it is easy to notice that the universal is identified with the Western democracy 
though it is questionable how universal the Western project is. The most relevant aspect now is to 
underline that the universal is articulated as concrete in all the countries where the universal values 
are shared. The principles of the Spanish patriotism are legitimized because they are a part of the 
democratic values, which are universal. This articulation creates a wide space to categorize other 
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political projects as undemocratic if they do not accept this notion of nationalism. Furthermore the 
situation must be observed in the concrete contexts. If constitutional patriotism represents universal 
values, as formulated by the Popular Party, other perspectives which do not share these values are 
not available because they do not follow democratic rules. For this reason, it is very important to 
draw on the chain of signifiers in which the nodal point is articulated as a concrete representation of 
Western democracy as a universal empty signifier. According to the document of the conservatives: 
 
We understand that the historic and moral fundaments of constitutional patriotism in Spain are the values 
inspired by the large agreement in the transition to democracy, the ones that are included in the Constitution 
and the ones that are developed in the statutes of autonomies. 
 
The pride of being Spanish does not come from ‘belonging to’ or ‘being from’, it is a rational 
pride derived from the common ability to solve three problems in Spain: overcoming the civil 
struggles (Transition), establishing a democratic regime based on the State of Law (Constitution) 
and the recognition of plurality and regional solidarity (statutes of autonomies). The actualization of 
the universal signifier reflects a triangle formed by nation, law and state and above all the will to 
represent a general consensus over all the issues which hinder the development of the Spanish 
nation, as a sort of feeling linked to Spanish nationalism. It is interesting to see how significance is 
attributed to the empty signifier in order to present a particular project as universal and how this is 
really only one of the possibilities of discursive articulation. 
The main problem of the Spanish nationalism, as I mentioned before, is the connotations 
relating it to the nationalist dictatorship. It is almost impossible to initiate a debate about the 
Spanish nation without considering it as a new version of nationalism under Franco. The Popular 
Party proposal aims to dissolve the references to this historic formation. Firstly, the signifier 
‘nationalism’ is replaced by ‘patriotism’ and ‘Spanish’ by ‘constitutional’. The problem is that the 
difference between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ is difficult to understand outside the academic 
environment – and even inside it is not so easy to agree about its meanings. There is a risk of 
interpreting both as synonymous and thinking that they refer to the same discursive formation. The 
signifier ‘constitutional’ is used to avoid the identification between the traditional nationalism and 
the new patriotism since the focus is on the Constitution and, at other times, on the political nation 
and not on the nation, ethnicity or the historical and cultural community. 
In order to initiate the new phase, overcoming nationalism and developing patriotism, it is 
necessary to reach a closure of the former phase, namely franquism, especially because the right 
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wing is still associated with the dictatorial regime. The Popular Party distances itself from the past, 
although shyly, and prefers to insist on the Transition as a general agreement through which all the 
conflicts disappeared. The equation is quite simple: democracy is consensus, and after ending the 
dictatorship, democracy emerges and this means that all the Spaniards accept the same frame. The 
Popular Party considers two options: 
 
- Not accepting the current situation: it is claimed that Spaniards talk about the current 
Spain and not that from the seventies. They regret that “some people are still 
developing their discourse in relation to this [Spain in the seventies], as if they missed 
situations and problems which we fortunately have overcome”. The closure affects the 
discussion of the past and, even more relevant, the impact of the previous conflicts on 
the democracy, both national and related to class and social and political rights. Thus, 
some nationalist demands and demands from the left wing are old and unfruitful after 
the Transition. 
- Accepting the current situation: the acceptation of the Constitution is implied, because 
it is “the overcoming of all historic disagreements between Spaniards”. The problems 
solved are, according to the document: the “two Spains”, religious issues, procedures 
to solve social problems, the leadership of the state and the territorial model. The 
closure is broader and fixed by the signifier ‘Constitution’, which establishes a logic of 
equivalence with the elements just enumerated: the ideological right-left conflict (two 
Spains), religion (it is not mentioned whether they defend the laic state or assume that 
the catholic religion is majority), the Republic would no longer be an option and the 
regional reforms are only possible inside the current territorial model. The acceptance 
of the situation is, at the same time, the acceptation of a discursive formation of Spain 
and, besides, it is contrary to Habermas’ integrating notion of patriotism in which the 
Constitution should suit the political moment (Mateo, 2005: 93). 
 
The merger of the three signifiers is complete: the common agreement and the project of the 
Transition – as an agreement of all the Spaniards – are the basis of the Constitution, which 
represents the national willingness, and fix the territorial model. It is not possible to question any of 
these signifiers because they refer to the Spaniards’ wishes and agreements. An attempt to change 
the state of autonomies would be interpreted as an attack against the Constitution and the national 
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will and a proposal of constitutional reform would be considered as an attack against the ‘spirit of 
the Transition’ (i.e. the national will). The empty signifier ‘constitutional patriotism’ reintroduces a 
particular notion of the Spanish nation, strongly linked to a particular constitution as the 
concretization of universal values. Nevertheless, a discursive formation cannot emerge without 
antagonism. I have mentioned some of them but my intention in the following is to show in detail 
how antagonism is part of the articulation of a new Spanish nationalism. 
 
Bad patriots: limits and exclusions 
 
The introduction of ‘constitutional patriotism’ makes it possible to fix the discourse of 
nationalism, without talking implicitly about nationalism - in opposition to the situation before 
where the discursive formation lacked a nodal point. The empty signifier helps to develop the logic 
of equivalence and dissolve the differences when it fixes what being a Spaniard means. But the 
equivalence does not emerge from the positive – I am Spaniard – but from the negative, i.e. the 
negation of the identity which does not suit my own identity. It is obvious that the category 
‘Spaniards’ gather other categories such as class, gender, race, religion, and some individuals share 
this category because they feel they are Spaniards and not because they consider themselves to be 
workers, women, gays, Muslims or Basques – they put their secondary identity before the primary 
one, and they do not constitute their identity on the primary one. In this context the equivalences of 
‘being patriot’ are elaborated against those who are not considered patriots due to the fact that they 
do not respect the constitution or the state of autonomies. 
The constitutional patriotism aims explicitly to struggle against an antagonistic formation: the 
peripheral nationalisms. The universal values, the openness and the rationality, as I have described, 
are opposed to the particularism of nationalism: 
 
The excluding nationalism is an unconditional, non critical, and morally indifferent adhesion to their own 
community of belonging. For this nationalism, one is good if she is a nationalist and if she supports her 
community of belonging, reasonably or unreasonably.  
             
Because of the confidence in the constitutive value of the signifier ‘patriotism’, the Popular 
Party claims that in the 20th century the excluding nationalism does not make any sense but neither 
would a Spanish neo-nationalism. The conservative party denies being nationalist. Applying the 
combination of patriotism – vs. nationalism – and loyalty to the constitution, they describe 
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peripheral nationalism as ‘non constitutional nationalism’ because it “exalters the difference and 
gives priority to identity and not to liberty.” The conservative formation is constituted by the 
opposition of the nodal points ‘patriotism’ / ‘nationalism’, which is the basis upon which to 
articulate a change of oppositions: universal / particular, irrational / rational adhesion, ethnicity / 
ethic, difference / coexistence, identity / liberty. The way the conservatives constitute the discursive 
formation against other formations has a lot of consequences in the institutional design: 
 
- The Constitution must not be reformed: “nothing is for ever. […] But it is also true that 
it is neither good nor convenient to make a crisis about something that is working. […] 
Questioning every 25 years the Spanish model will only lead us to uncertainty”. This 
attitude against any change under any circumstance makes Gallego-Díaz (2001) use 
the label ‘constitutional fundamentalism’ to reflect the excessive emphasis on the 
unchangeable constitution.  
- The state of autonomies is the only model: “our autonomic system has a degree of 
political decentralization that is high or higher than the federal states.” This argument 
is contradictory because they refuse afterwards to use the term ‘federalism’, which is 
against their own national history and the Constitution. The strong refusal of the 
signifier, only due to history, is an attempt to avoid the articulation of the territorial 
model inside the Spanish republican tradition, whose heritage belongs to the left. 
- The regional statutes of autonomy must not be reformed: there is no need for more 
decentralization because the problem of pluralism is solved. Every tendency to reach 
more autonomy, not to mention independence, is against the constitution and the 
solidarity between the regions. In opposition to the selfishness attributed to the 
peripheral nationalisms, Navarra is used as the best example because it has some 
historical, economic advantages but it is, at the same time, loyal to the constitution and 
shows solidarity towards the other regions. 
    
The ‘constitutional patriotism’ is constituted against ‘non constitutional nationalism’ creating 
a closed model of the state and a constitutional system in which there is no alternative to the 
confrontation between the central state and the peripheral nationalisms – apart from accepting the 
current system without any reform, which is not very plausible. Furthermore, the conservative 
patriotism struggles against the social democrat patriotism, since they use the same nodal point to 
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articulate antagonist discourses. There is no trace of the republican tradition in the conservative 
recontextualization of patriotism (Velasco, 2002: 39) and it is a rather effective way of naming the 
national feeling. If the Popular Party’s discourse becomes hegemonic, the PSOE should adapt to 
some demands and significations or else it could be attacked for being ‘anti-patriotic’ or ‘anti-
constitutional’. In this case, not only the nationalist vision would be excluded by the dominant 
discourse but also alternatives projects on how the idea of the Spanish nation could be develop. Not 
least, if all the political consequences of the conservative formation must be shown, it is necessary 
to pay attention to the articulation of terrorism in the constitutional patriotism. In the following 
figure, I summarize the articulation of constitutional patriotism according to the Popular Party and 
their inclusions underlying the apparent consensus: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism is identified as the main and only problem, which can be fought by the unity of all 
the democrats sharing the values of constitutional patriotism. This claim is normal inside a 
democratic conception where the rejection of violence is one of the pillars. However, it is more 
problematic how terrorism – more exactly the fight against terrorism – is articulated in the 
conservative formation. The best example of national cooperation is the Agreement for liberties and 
against terrorism reached by the Popular Party and the social democrats in 2000. At that moment, 
the new strategy against terrorism impacted the political arena since the political wing of ETA, 
Batasuna, was considered a terrorist group and an attack on the nationalist parties’ (especially 
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Partido Nacionalista Vasco) understanding towards or sympathy for Batasuna and ETA was 
initiated. In their document, the Popular Party’s policy against terrorism has and will have serious 
implications, although it will develop as part of the constitutional patriotism in the future. The core 
points underlined are the following: 
 
- Fighting against terrorist organizations, their ramifications and their environment: It is 
the beginning of the illegalization of Batasuna as a political party and other young 
organisations and the closure of the newspaper Egin. The signifier ‘terrorism’ acquires 
a broader signified, politically and legally, and the idea that nationalist parties share the 
terrorist values, when the PP states: “including those who, directly or indirectly, 
support or understand them”, is introduced. 
- A narrow understanding of leading the fight against terrorism: institutional loyalty is 
presented as equivalent to loyalty between democratic parties. As it would happen later 
under Zapatero’s government, the loyalty presupposes a previous agreement and, in 
case this does not exist or is incomplete, one of parties (the Popular Party in this case) 
can accuse the other of not defending the democracy. 
- Rejecting any kind of agreement with groups, associations or parties close to the 
terrorists: any partial or general agreement would be accompanied by accusations of 
supporting terrorism. 
- The impossibility of a negotiated solution: segregation is not a legitimized target, 
because it goes against the constitution, and “nothing can be achieved under the 
pressure of violence or guns.” This position would later make the negation process 
initiated by Zapatero difficult as the Socialist Party was accused of surrendering to 
terrorism. 
 
The articulation of the constitutional patriotism against peripheral nationalisms and terrorism, 
above all, is directed against the social democratic project. The initial agreement on fighting against 
terrorism would result in the imposition of this vision to all possible scenarios and make it 
impossible to propose new alternatives against terrorism once this agreement was fixed and later 
understood on the conditions of the Popular Party. On the other hand, the marginalization of the 
nationalist parties is far from ending antagonism and, on the contrary, nationalism strengthens their 
positions against the central state and they can take advantage of the resulting victimization.   
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Towards national constitutionalism 
   
The articulation of constitutional patriotism in the conservative formation starts in 2002 but it 
does not develop later. The empty signifier is early left. Firstly, there is not really an intention to 
apply the theoretical ideas of constitutional patriotism to the political praxis. As I pointed out, 
constitutional patriotism is presented as an open and not well defined frame, in which the universal, 
ethic and rational values are used to oppose to peripheral nationalism. When we look the concrete 
application of the signifier, it is clear that the triangle – Transition, Constitution, State of 
Autonomies – reflects the political program of the Popular Party, and it is not based on the theory of 
patriotism.  
Although the signifier ‘patriotic’ does not offer the possibility to build a formation which 
could distinguish it from ‘national’, the nodal point ‘constitutional patriotism’ succeeds in creating 
an opportunity to articulate a national discourse since the only signifier available before was 
Spanish nationalism. This has actually had an important impact because it has made it easy to 
introduce other topics which were previously rejected due to the link with centralism or the 
traditional nationalism. The use of the national flag – as a national symbol – became a key topic in 
2002 and recently, in 2008, a manifesto regarding the threats against Spanish – as a national 
language for all Spaniards – has been signed by some relevant intellectuals.                
The close connection between ‘patriotic’ and ‘constitutional’ has had some political 
consequences – some of them has already been pointed out – and has determined the national 
politics of the social democrat Rodríguez Zapatero. When he tried to initiate a reform of the 
regional statutes, mainly that of Catalonia, he was the blank of a lot of critics because it was argued 
that it would destroy the national unity and promote a balkanization of the country – and it would be 
an act against the spirit of consensus of the Transition and against the state of autonomies. 
Zapatero’s attempt to reach a negotiated solution regarding terrorism was accused of being a sign of 
surrendering to terrorism and breaking the agreement reached by himself when he was the leader of 
the opposition. Terrorism was not disconnected from the territorial problem and the Popular Party 
insisted that there was a secret agreement between the government and ETA to deliver Navarra to 
the Basque Country. 
Since the relationship with peripheral nationalism has not improved and especially the Basque 
nationalism has become the main enemy, it is a fact that ‘constitutional patriotism’, as understood 
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by the Popular Party, was not capable of creating an including frame for all political positions. It 
was predictable that the peripheral nationalisms would not accept it since they do not hide that their 
aims cannot be satisfied inside the state of autonomies (Esteban, 2002). The conflict between the 
Basque nationalism and the central state has actually increased and the reform of the Catalan statute 
of autonomy has become quite controversial. From the political opposition, the Popular Party has 
intensified the cultural and historical elements and promotes the pride of being a Spaniard6, trying 
to enhance the sentimental feeling of the nation, which is still underdeveloped in Spain (Béjar, 
2008: 267). This position contrasts with the less determined attitude shown by the social democrats 
and the position of the peripheral nationalisms and the appeal to civic responsibilities. However, the 
Popular Party is still pendent to find a new empty signifier in order to articulate their discourse, 
whilst they want to avoid applying ‘Spanish nationalism’.   
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